



Oxford Cambridge and RSA

**Tuesday 21 May 2019 – Afternoon**

**A Level History A**

**Y307/01 Tudor Foreign Policy 1485–1603**

**Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes**



**You must have:**

- the OCR 12-page Answer Booklet  
(OCR12 sent with general stationery)

**INSTRUCTIONS**

- Use black ink.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and any **two** questions in Section B.
- Write your answers in the Answer Booklet. The question number(s) must be clearly shown.

**INFORMATION**

- The total mark for this paper is **80**.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets [ ].
- Quality of extended responses will be assessed in questions marked with an asterisk (\*).
- This document consists of **4** pages.

## SECTION A

Read the two passages and then answer Question 1.

- 1 Evaluate the interpretations in **both** of the two passages and explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of how successful Elizabeth's campaigns were against the Spanish Armadas. [30]

**Passage A**

The defeat of the Armada, usually seen as the greatest victory in English naval history, may have been given exaggerated significance. There are also certain myths that need to be challenged. The Armada was not defeated by a smaller force. Nor, arguably, was it defeated by the English at all. The English ships were able to inflict damage at close quarters but not to destroy the Spanish formation. It was really factors working against the Armada which decided the outcome. These included the lack of any provision for the collection of the Duke of Parma's invasion force and the onset of bad weather which did far more damage than the English ships ever could. The precise turning point was the use of fireships and the subsequent storms which completed the job. It could also be argued that England lost the opportunity in 1589 to inflict a major blow against Spain. Portugal, annexed in 1580, was ripe for revolt against Spanish rule and the purpose of the expedition of 1589 therefore was to incite a rebellion, destroy the remaining ships and seize the fleet at the Azores. The enterprise, however, proved a disaster since the revolt did not materialise. Spanish historians consider this as great a failure as the Armada. Nor will it do to overestimate England's strength in relation to Spain. The very nature of England's war with Spain showed the limitations of its military base. The struggle could only be defensive, or, if offensive, piecemeal. This meant privateering was the only form of offensive action. Nor did this activity prevent Spain from launching further Armadas.

Adapted from S. Lee, *Elizabeth I*, p. 103–4, published in 2007.

**Passage B**

Elizabeth's handling of overall strategy has been criticised. The failure of the 'silver blockade', the debacle of the Rouen expedition and the fiasco of the Portugal campaign in 1589 have all been cited as evidence for Elizabeth's weaknesses as a war commander. Yet such criticisms are misplaced, for they arise from a misunderstanding of Elizabeth's intentions and an underestimation of her difficulties. Elizabeth's principal war aims, unlike those of many of her commanders and advisers, were neither the destruction of Spanish power nor the acquisition of a colonial empire. In war, as in peace, she sought above all national security. In practical terms this meant a favourable settlement in the Netherlands, the freedom of the French Channel ports from Spanish control, and the survival of Spain and France as strong independent powers. She had no conception of an overall grand strategy to bring Spain to its knees; she did not seriously contemplate an invasion of Spain or Portugal, a full-scale silver blockade, or the seizure of colonial bases. At sea, she sought to use the English fleets merely to disrupt Spanish communications, intercept Spanish treasure and defend home waters. Ultimately her objectives were achieved. Spain was bloodied but undefeated. The Southern Netherlands were restored to Spain on a semi-autonomous basis while the Northern provinces remained free. Protestantism and national independence were safeguarded from foreign threats. Her policies did not achieve all this; external factors were more important, but the policies undoubtedly helped.

Adapted from S. Doran, *England and Europe 1485–1603*, p. 78–9, published in 1986.

**SECTION B**

Answer **TWO** of the following three questions.

- 2\*** To what extent was England's position in Europe stronger in the period 1558–1603 than in the period 1485–1558? **[25]**
- 3\*** To what extent were relations with Scotland better in the period 1560–1603 than in the period 1485 to 1560? **[25]**
- 4\*** 'Tudor foreign policy had little impact on domestic developments in England.' How far do you agree? **[25]**

**END OF QUESTION PAPER**

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